Manejo Adaptivo en Planes de Conservación de Hábitat

Resumen: Los planes de conservación de hábitat (PCH) permiten la captura incidental de especies amenazadas o en peligro a cambio de medidas de conservación que minimicen y mitiguen tales capturas. Los planes de conservación de hábitat conllevan un compromiso entre certidumbre en los reglamentos e incertidumbre científica. El compromiso es controversial porque se piensa que muchos PCH enfrentan la incertidumbre científica inadecuadamente. El manejo adaptivo es la obtención sistemática y aplicación de información confiable para mejorar el manejo de recursos en el tiempo. Idealmente, bajo el manejo adaptivo, las estrategias de conservación se instrumentan como un experimento deliberado. Este enfoque puede establecer relaciones de causa -efecto y señalar el camino para estrategias óptimas. El manejo adaptivo se ha considerado esencial para el manejo bajo incertidumbre, sin embargo, pocos PCH incorporan el manejo adaptivo genuino. Los planes de conservación de hábitat seguirán careciendo de manejo adaptivo hasta que se cumplan ciertas condiciones, tales como reconocer que un PCH es una hipótesis de manejo, el interés de los propietarios de tierras en mejorar los resultados biológicos y suficientes recursos financieros. Los incentivos económicos fomentarían el manejo adaptivo en los PCH. Los permisionarios de los PCH podrían recibir pagos directos o deducciones de impuestos por información confiable que beneficie a una especie. Se podrían otorgar "créditos de mitigación" por información producida a través del manejo adaptivo. En efecto, se canjearía hábitat por información benéfica para una especie. El exitoso uso de los créditos de mitigación depende de la correcta evaluación de la información y aplicación del Acta de Especies en Peligro de E.U.A. Bajo una aproximación de que "el contaminador precautorio paga el principal" de los PCH, un permisionario podría fijar un bono de seguro ambiental. Porciones del bono se devuelven con intereses a medida que el manejo adaptivo de-
Introduction
Adaptive management is widely recognized as an intelligent, if not essential, approach to the management of natural resources under uncertainty ( Walters & Holling 1990; Irwin & Wigley 1993; Parma et al. 1998) . As originally conceived, adaptive management can be defined as the systematic acquisition and application of reliable information to improve management over time. Although developed in the 1970s ( Holling 1978) , adaptive management is still a poorly understood concept that has been repeatedly misapplied or misappropriated (Halbert 1993; Walters 1997 ). Many natural resource managers are not aware of the scientific principles underlying genuine adaptive management. The meaning of adaptive management and its proper application have been particularly ambiguous with respect to habitat conservation plans (HCPs).
Habitat conservation plans show promise as an effective means for resolving conflicts between the U.S. Endangered Species Act ( ESA) and the legitimate use of natural resources ( Bean & Wilcove 1997; Noss et al. 1997 ). An HCP is the basis for a contract between an "applicant" (typically a private landowner) and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service or the National Marine Fisheries Service (the services), who are responsible for protecting federally listed threatened and endangered species. The contract allows a permittee (formerly the applicant) to incidentally take listed species in exchange for conservation measures that minimize and mitigate such taking. Habitat conservation plans attempt to reconcile the economic costs of habitat protection with the risks of species extinction. Our knowledge of species and habitats is usually poor; consequently, crafting such compromise is fraught with scientific uncertainty. To deal with uncertainty and its attendant risks, adaptive management is often invoked. To date, however, the "adaptive management" described in most HCPs does little to reduce risk. A study of HCPs indicates that only about 5% of HCPs have a "monitoring plan sufficient to evaluate the [HCP's] success" ( Kareiva et al. 1999) .
Many of the problems associated with adaptive management in HCPs can be attributed to (1) misunderstanding of the adaptive management concept, (2) misunderstanding of Section 10(a) of the ESA and regulations promulgated pursuant to the act, and (3) a lack of will, or incentives, to implement HCPs based on adaptive management. My goal here is to (1) contribute to a common understanding of the adaptive management concept; (2) review the current relationship between adaptive management and HCPs; and (3) discuss the future of adaptive management in HCPs, including incentives to encourage it.
Adaptive Management
Adaptive management is a misunderstood concept, which is not surprising. The numerous parties involved in resolving contentious natural resource management issuesscientists, managers, landowners, lawyers, concerned citizens, political activists-possess different professional backgrounds and perspectives. For instance, some managers believe that good management is by definition "adaptive." But to them, adaptive simply means a willingness to change. They have not been informed, or have not understood, that adaptive management is a thoroughly new paradigm for managing natural resources. Other stakeholders equate adaptive management with "flexible management" ( Halbert 1993) or see it as an opportunity to contest policies they consider objectionable. All these views ignore a key aspect of adaptive management, the systematic acquisition of reliable information.
Understanding of adaptive management will be enhanced by first understanding the alternatives: deferred action and trial and error ( Walters & Hilborn 1978; Walters & Holling 1990) . Under deferred action, an ecosystem is not managed until after it is understood. Only minimal disturbance is allowed while basic research is conducted to determine key processes and relationships. Deferred action is an ecologically cautious approach, but it has an economic cost due to the discounting of future revenues. The longer management is deferred, the larger the loss in net present value ( Herfindahl & Kneese 1974) . Consequently, deferred action is unattractive to most private land managers. There is also a sound scientific argument against deferred action. Behavior of an undisturbed ecosystem can be dramatically different than that of a managed ecosystem, so knowledge acquired while deferring action may not be valid for the managed ecosystem ( Walters & Hilborn 1978; Parma et al. 1998) .
Trial and error has been and continues to be the dominant paradigm in natural resource management. Trial and error typically emphasizes the "trial," which entails resource utilization and produces revenue, but neglects error detection, which entails costly monitoring. Trialand-error approaches are also referred to as "learning by doing" (Haney & Power 1996) or "evolutionary" ( Walters & Holling 1990) undoubtedly learn by doing, but particular types of learning do more harm than good. Casual observations, anecdotal reports, and unreplicated case studies lack statistically valid experimental design and are likely to yield unreliable information. Managers relying on these types of learning may fail to detect errors-damage to the environment-and risk perpetuating harmful policy. Although biological evolution might be a trial-and-error process, each individual in a population is a trial, so there are many trials running simultaneously. Under trial and error, managers typically implement a single policy and assume it is satisfactory until proved otherwise.
Trial-and-error approaches lead to small, incremental changes over time ( Halbert 1993) . Major changes, when they occur, are often driven by political pressure stemming from social concerns. Social concerns could be incited by a species threatened with extinction or the collapse of an overexploited fish stock. Given these common scenarios, trial and error may be more accurately described as "reactive learning" ( Hilborn 1992) or "crisis management" ( Halbert 1993) . Trial and error undervalues information, so data collection is poorly funded. For this reason, trial and error appears to be relatively inexpensive, and it will be if all goes as expected. But natural resource management is full of surprises. If all costs are considered-the costs of undetected environmental damage, management inefficiencies, interrupted operations, lawsuits-then trial and error may be relatively expensive over the long run. The heated controversy over management of national forests in the Pacific Northwest ( Thomas et al. 1993; Marcot & Thomas 1997 ) demonstrates the myriad shortcomings of trial and error.
In contrast, under adaptive management, major drivers of change are generated internally. Regular adjustments to policies are acknowledged as necessary and desirable. Information is highly valued, so data collection is well funded. The costs of research and monitoring make adaptive management seem relatively expensive. But if all costs are considered, then adaptive management may be relatively inexpensive over the long run. In theory, investments in reliable information should yield excellent returns in the sustainable use of natural resources (Smith & Walters 1981; Hilborn et al. 1995; Walters & Green 1997 ) .
Adaptive management comes in two varieties, passive and active ( Walters & Hilborn 1978) . Passive adaptive management has been confused with trial-and-error approaches ( Irwin & Wigley 1993; Parma et al. 1998) . As originally conceived, passive adaptive management is a scientifically rigorous process of formulating predictive models, making policy decisions based on those models, and revising the models as monitoring data become available ( Walters & Hilborn 1978; Hilborn 1992 ; Fig. 1 ). The model is used to predict ecosystem responses to management activities. In theory, activities can be intentionally designed to perturb the ecosystem in a way that enhances parameter estimation (Isermann 1981) . Monitoring and evaluation systems are in place before management commences, but monitoring is done without controls, replication, or randomization-the three essential aspects of statistically valid experimental design ( Hurlbert 1984) . Consequently, passive adaptive management has a flaw: it cannot establish cause-and-effect relationships between management activities and changes in ecosystem conditions. Without controls, replication, and randomization, managers often cannot determine whether the observed responses were caused by the management activity of interest, by some other activity, or by some "natural" process. The advantages to passive adaptive management are that it is relatively simple and cheap.
Under active adaptive management, management activities are conducted as a deliberate experiment ( Walters & Hilborn 1978; Fig. 2) . Alternative policies are viewed as treatments and are implemented through statistically valid experimental design. Monitoring is the data-collection step of the experiment. Active adaptive management can establish cause-and-effect relationships between management activities and changes in ecological conditions. Active adaptive management leads to a better understanding of how and why natural systems respond to management. Active adaptive management has another advantage over the passive approach: responses to a range of treatments can point the way toward an optimal policy. The disadvantages of active adaptive management are that it is more complex and more expensive. Walters (1997 ) said, "The essential idea of adaptive management is to recognize explicitly that management policies can be applied as experimental treatments." A crucial implication of Walter's statement is that monitoring activities must be integrated with management activities. Under adaptive management, monitoring is not the last chapter of a conservation plan; rather, monitoring and conservation plans are developed concurrently to form a single adaptive-management plan. The evolution of the adaptive-management concept has been away from passive approaches and toward active approaches ( Forest Ecosystem Management Assessment Team 1993; Irwin & Wigley 1993; Lee 1993 ). I will henceforth use the term adaptive management to refer to active adaptive or experimental approaches to management.
Habitat Conservation Plans
The ESA of 1973 did not allow compromise. The U.S. Congress legislated an absolute prohibition against the taking of endangered wildlife ( Bean 1983) . This seemingly idealistic approach to the conservation of endangered species created several problems. First, government officials were reluctant to enforce a law that prohibited and potentially punished an extremely wide range of otherwise lawful activities, such as forestry and real-estate development. Second, fear of land-use restric-tions incited some landowners to deliberately destroy habitats of endangered species ( Hood 1998) . Third, landowner apprehension interfered with scientists' ability to monitor and understand endangered species; some landowners refrained from reporting occurrences of endangered species on their property. Finally, the ESA unfairly penalized landowners who happened to own the last available habitat of a species after all surrounding habitat had been destroyed (Hood 1998) . According to Bean and Wilcove (1997 ) , the absolute prohibitions of the act did little to conserve habitats of federally listed species on nonfederal lands.
In 1982, Section 10 of the ESA was amended to allow compromise. The amendment "establishes a procedure whereby those persons whose actions may affect endangered or threatened species may receive permits for the incidental taking of such species, provided the action will not jeopardize the continued existence of the species" ( U.S. Congress, House of Representatives 1982). Section 10(a) authorizes such incidental take subject to the approval of an HCP. The amendment was, in effect, Congressional approval for a compromise between the economic costs of habitat protection on private lands and the likelihood of species extinction.
Under Section 10(a), issuance of an incidental take permit requires that (1) the taking is incidental to otherwise lawful activities; (2) the taking is, to the maximum extent practicable, minimized and mitigated; (3) adequate funding for the plan is ensured, (4) the taking will not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of a species in the wild; and (5) such other measures be implemented that the services may require as being necessary or appropriate for purposes of the plan. The first criterion is easily satisfied. The last criterion gives the services authority to require monitoring and/or adaptive management. The relationship between the second and fourth criteria warrants discussion. The second criterion is an economic test establishing the maximum conservation (i.e., mitigation and minimization) required of an applicant. In effect, it says that applicants are required to bear the greatest cost they can practicably afford. The fourth criterion is a biological test establishing the minimum conservation required by the applicant. The logic of these two criteria is clear: satisfying the biological criterion is necessary but not sufficient; a valid HCP also must demonstrate that it satisfies the economic criterion. At present, the services do not require an applicant to disclose financial analyses of their HCPs ( U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service & National Marine Fisheries Service 1996) , so the validity of many HCPs could be legitimately questioned.
Only 12 HCPs were approved between 1983 and 1992 ( Hood 1998). For many reasons, HCPs were not as attractive to private landowners as Congress may have hoped. In 1994 the Secretary of the Interior issued the "no-surprises" policy, which gave private landowners long-term regulatory certainty, an attractive incentive. It said that the services would never require additional Walters and Hilborn (1978) .
commitments of land or financial compensation beyond that agreed to under the terms of the HCP. Even if unforeseen circumstances arose that could jeopardize the species' survival, the permittee would not have to provide additional habitat conservation. In effect, the nosurprises policy precluded future modifications to an HCP and led to a proliferation of HCPs. By 1997, over 212 HCPs had been approved and at least 200 more were being developed ( Kaiser 1997 ) . About 78% of HCPs cover less than 200 ha each, but at least two HCPs each cover more than 400,000 ha ( U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service & National Marine Fisheries Service 2000) . The majority have dealt with commercial forest management and real-estate development ( Hood 1998) .
As written, the no-surprises policy did not allow compromise. The permittee was given absolute regulatory certainty, with no provisions for the myriad scientific uncertainties associated with complex ecosystems. This elicited considerable criticism from scientists (G. Meffe et al. 1996 . Endangered species legislation shouldn't flout scientific reality, a letter from 169 scientists to Senator John Chafee; D. Murphy et al. 1997 . A statement on proposed private lands initiatives and reauthorization of the Endangered Species Act from the meeting of scientists at Stanford University). They considered no-surprises to be a flawed policy and a troubling obstacle to adaptive management. The services were not ignorant of the need for adaptive management. Their own handbook for HCPs ( U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service & National Marine Fisheries Service 1996) said that "Where significant uncertainty exists, it can be addressed through the incorporation and implementation of adaptive management measures into HCPs," and that "... there should be a clear understanding and agreement between the services and the permittee as to the mitigation range of adjustment which might be required as a result of any adaptive management provisions." The services' handbook and the no-surprises policy were inconsistent, however, and the heavily promoted policy instilled in HCP applicants expectations of absolute certainty.
The policy was codified in 1998 ( U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service & National Marine Fisheries Service 1998), but the new regulations now contain a mechanism for addressing uncertainty. Compromise between the regulatory certainty sought by the applicant and the scientific uncertainty associated with complex ecosystems can be negotiated. Compromise is based on a distinction between "changed circumstances" and "unforeseen circumstances." Changed circumstances are those that "can reasonably be anticipated" and "can be planned for." Fire in areas prone to wildfire is an example. In contrast, unforeseen circumstances are those that "could not reasonably have been anticipated." The assurances given to permittees depend on the nature of future circumstances. If a circumstance changes in a way provided for in the HCP, then the permittee will implement the specified conservation measures. This part of the new regulations is an improvement over the original no-surprises policy because HCPs can change in response to future events. But if there is no provision in the HCP for that particular changed circumstance, then no additional conservation measures are required from the permittee. If an unforeseen circumstance occurs, changes to the HCP cannot involve additional land or financial compensation or additional restrictions without the consent of the permittee. This is the same deal granted under the no-surprises policy.
About a year after the new regulations were announced, the services presented their "5-point policy initiative," which is an addendum to the services' HCP handbook ( U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service & National Marine Fisheries Service 2000). Two points provide additional guidance regarding expectations for adaptive management and monitoring, the most important of which is a discussion of experimental approaches for evaluating alternative conservation strategies.
How will the new federal regulations and five-point policy initiative affect the use of adaptive management in HCPs? The services clearly expect that HCPs will be modified in response to changing circumstances, but they also accept limits on those changes. The extent of the limitations is unclear and will depend on how the categories of "changed circumstances" and "unforeseen circumstances" are addressed during negotiations. Anticipating, planning for, and monitoring "changed circumstances" is the mechanism through which adaptive management can be incorporated into HCPs. An HCP based on adaptive management should produce three products: habitat for covered species, financial profit for the permittee, and reliable information.
Negotiating Adaptive Management
The new regulations for HCPs open the door to adaptive management. But adaptive management, like many aspects of an HCP, will be negotiated. Although negotiated solutions to habitat conservation are considered unseemly by some scientists, this approach is gaining acceptance ( Noss et al. 1997; Richter & Redford 1999) . The outcome of negotiations-the level of commitment to adaptive management-will be affected by the applicant's situation and values. Lee (1993) describes institutional conditions favoring adaptive management. Some of Lee's conditions suggest that HCPs and adaptive management should be compatible; others reveal why HCPs rarely incorporate adaptive management but point the way toward corrective policies. According to Lee (1993) , the following conditions must be met before decisionmakers will adopt genuine adaptive management:
(1) There must be a mandate to take action in the face of uncertainty. This is true of all HCPs. The principal parties, the HCP applicant and the services, have a strong motivation to act. The applicant desires economic profit from ownership of a natural resource such as timber or undeveloped land but is frustrated by the ESA. The services perceive HCPs as a means to acquire both ecological benefits for listed species and political support for the ESA ( Moser 2000) .
(2) Preservation of pristine environments must no longer be an option. This is almost always true for HCPs: the habitats involved have already been affected by human activities. In some rare cases, preservation is an option if sufficient funds are available to purchase land or a conservation easement. Stronger Congressional support for and stricter enforcement of the ESA are also options, but these seem politically unrealistic at this time.
(3) Human intervention must not be able to produce desired outcomes predictably. Our understanding of most species is too poor to predict outcomes, so this condition is likely to be met. If it is false, however, then there is no need for adaptive management.
(4) There must be sufficient stability to measure longterm outcomes. Lee is referring to institutional stability, and such stability is a fundamental goal of HCPs. An HCP is formalized through a binding contract, the implementation agreement that typically lasts many decades or even a century (e.g., Washington Department of Natural Resources 1997 ). The services claim to enforce the contract through compliance monitoring of the permittee ( U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service & National Marine Fisheries Service 1998). Although implementation agreements usually include provisions allowing a permittee to terminate the contract, such provisions often require mitigation for incidental take that has occurred under the HCP. This acts as an effective disincentive against termination. Adaptive management may not be feasible for short-term HCPs.
(5) It must be possible to formulate hypotheses. Most HCPs are nothing more than a set of management hypotheses. A plausible hypothesis is built upon existing theory and fact patterns. Likewise, development of an HCP requires at least a rudimentary understanding of the managed ecosystem. Adaptive management should be designed to experimentally test the implicit hypotheses of an HCP. This condition should be met for a legitimate HCP. Again, an HCP must "not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild." This test would be difficult to administer without basic information about the effects of habitat management on the listed species. If the fifth condition is not met, then implementation of an HCP should be deferred.
(6) Theory, models, and field methods must be available to estimate and infer ecosystem-scale behavior. A rudimentary understanding of the managed ecosystem is needed to develop the monitoring and evaluation components of adaptive management. The most important things to monitor and how to monitor them must be somewhat apparent. An ability to identify indicator variables and design efficient sampling schemes will enable more effective monitoring. Evaluation should be based on specific biological objectives. If adequate understanding is lacking, then an "adaptive monitoring design" (Ringold et al. 1996) could be considered.
( 7 ) Decision-makers must be aware that they are experimenting. And, I would add, they must be aware of the potential hazards associated with those uncertainties. By "experimenting" Lee means that actions have uncertain outcomes. With uncertainty comes risk, risk that an HCP will jeopardize the survival of a species. Scientists rarely have the opportunity to convey uncertainties to decision-makers, and decision-makers often fail to fully appreciate the potential hazards stemming from uncertainty. This condition might be satisfied through a requirement to explicitly express the uncertainties associated with an HCP, and the mechanism to do so exists in Section 10(a). Again, an HCP must "not appreciably reduce the likelihood of the survival and recovery of the species in the wild." This requirement implies a risk assessment, but many if not most HCPs do not present risk assessments for the survival or recovery of a species (Smallwood et al. 1999; Smallwood 2000) . This condition also entails a public relations problem for the applicant. Citizen groups may be unwilling to accept any risks associated with adaptive management ( Walters & Holling 1990; Lee 1993) . Hence, admitting uncertainty, a key step toward adaptive management, may be perceived by the applicant as creating vulnerability. In the contentious atmosphere surrounding some HCPs, applicants negotiating in good faith may be unwilling to admit uncertainty when third parties can use it to their advantage.
(8) Organizational culture must encourage learning from experience. And, I would add, the culture must value reliable information. By "learning from experience," Lee means active adaptive management. Although nearly all natural resource managers profess their faith in learning from experience, few institute credible monitoring programs for doing so. Many managers obtain most of their information from casual observations and unreplicated case studies. Both sources are bound to be biased or misleading. An HCP applicant must believe that an important measure of success is acquisition of reliable information. Learning from experience is critical to success, but Lee (1993) cautions that adaptive management that conflicts with economic objectives will rarely be considered.
(9) Resources must be sufficient to measure ecosystem-scale behavior. At present, this condition is generally not met by HCPs, but stricter adherence to Section 10(a) would make it so. An HCP must "ensure that adequate funding for the plan will be provided." "Adequate funding" usually includes funding for monitoring, and that monitoring could be done in conjunction with adaptive management. Monitoring that provides reliable information for adaptive management is likely to be expensive, which discourages adaptive management.
(10) Decision-makers must care about improving outcomes over biological time scales. Lee's tenth condition addresses two psychological factors, motive and patience. A private landowner's main motive for an HCP is economic; the applicant desires a positive economic outcome. An HCP applicant may or may not care about biological outcomes, but an applicant will be persuaded to care if economic opportunities are linked to habitat conservation. Patience is the cardinal virtue of adaptive management; research and monitoring may take years or even decades to produce results. Therefore, the applicant must be persuaded through incentives or forced through regulations to be patient.
Conditions 1-4 are generally met by HCPs. Conditions 5 and 6 should be met for an HCP to be legitimate and scientifically based. The biggest impediments to basing HCPs on adaptive management are conditions 7-10. If Lee (1993) is correct, then as long as these conditions remain unsatisfied HCPs will lack adaptive management. The problems posed by condition 7 can be diminished if (1) decision-makers and the public become educated about uncertainty in natural resource management, and (2) scientists insist that scientific uncertainties are considered thoughtfully and addressed adequately. Without stricter regulations or economic incentives, conditions 8-10 will remain unsatisfied and HCP applicants will resist the cost of adaptive management.
Incentives for Adaptive Management in HCPs
To encourage adaptive management in HCPs, they should be negotiated such that reducing uncertainty results in tangible benefits to the HCP applicant. I propose two approaches for doing this. The first relies on various forms of compensation for reliable information. The second depends on an entirely new way of structuring HCPs.
As explained above, Section 10(a) of the ESA contains an economic criterion that requires the applicants to bear the maximum cost that they can practicably afford. This maximum cost, whatever it may be, establishes the total financial resources available for the HCP. When assessing this maximum cost, an applicant undoubtedly includes the costs of research and monitoring. Therefore, funds spent on research and monitoring are funds unavailable for habitat protection. On the other hand, funds spent on habitat protection are funds unavailable for adaptive management.
The lack of adaptive management in HCPs may be a rational outcome of economically based decisions made by the applicant. Reliable information needed for adaptive management comes at a cost to applicants, but the full economic value of that information is not returned to them. The services, other government agencies, and other HCP applicants will use the information at no cost. In the market of scientific information, a permittee's HCP generates a positive externality. That is, adaptive management releases information as a byproduct, and others benefit from it at no cost. In theory, an economic externality leads to an inefficient allocation of resources ( Herfindahl & Kneese 1974; Pearce & Turner 1990) ; in the case of HCPs, it leads to insufficient resources directed toward the acquisition of reliable information.
These issues raise the following questions: How can more and better adaptive management be encouraged in HCPs? How should the total cost of an HCP be split between conservation measures and adaptive management? What is the value of information that helps conserve an endangered species?
More and better adaptive management would be encouraged by compensating permittees for the reliable information they produce. Several types of compensation are possible: direct payments, tax deductions, and mitigation credits. Each would award fair compensation for information that benefits the conservation of a species. Direct payments could be accomplished through grants from federal agencies and would cover the permittee's costs for research and monitoring. Tax incentives for adaptive management would require modifications of the current tax code. Either payments or tax deductions would reduce the permittee's costs for adaptive management, and, according to the "maximum extent practicable" criterion, the savings must be redirected toward conservation measures.
Mitigation credits allow a permittee to do less habitat conservation in exchange for reliable information that benefits conservation efforts across a region. In effect, mitigation credits are an accounting mechanism for the financial resources allocated to adaptive management and not allocated to habitat protection. The credits could be awarded as information is produced or as steps in its production are completed. Mitigation credits for information would lead to better adaptive management if, and only if, the services (1) enforce the "maximum extent practicable" criterion, (2) are informed about the applicant's costs and expected profits from the HCP, (3) correctly value the information to be obtained, and (4) negotiate a fair exchange of mitigation credits for reliable information. The first condition is already required under the ESA, but-as discussed earlier-enforcement has been lax. The second condition is needed to enforce the first, but the services do not currently require financial disclosure by the applicant. Correctly valuing information, the third condition, poses an enormous challenge, especially when research or monitoring may take decades to yield useful results. Analytical methods for valuing information in natural resource management have been studied ( Walters & Green 1997 ) , but much work remains to be done.
Generally, the services do not consider research to be a form of mitigation ( U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service & National Marine Fisheries Service 1996) . Presumably, the services have the same attitude toward the costs of adaptive management. Given that the third condition cannot be met at this time, the services should maintain this attitude. But the services must face the fact that funds spent on adaptive management are funds unavailable for habitat protection, and they should explore the potential long-term net benefits of exchanging habitat protection for reliable information. The information obtained from one HCP can be applied to future HCPs and other conservation programs. The amount of research and monitoring needed by future HCPs could be reduced and the efficiency of conservation measures could be increased. As required by Section 10(a), the financial savings would be redirected toward more habitat conservation.
The second way to encourage adaptive management in HCPs relies on the "precautionary polluter pays principle" or "4P" (Costanza & Cornwell 1992) . The 4P is a practical formulation of the precautionary principle. There is no canonical precautionary principle, but most expressions of the principle make two demands: (1) humans must be extremely risk-averse when using natural resources, and (2) the burden of proving minimal risk must be shifted to those who exploit natural resources. The 4P approach has been promoted as a rational means for dealing with scientific uncertainty (O'Riordan & Jordan 1995; Gullett 1997) , but implementation of a precautionary principle remains controversial (Bodansky 1991; Dover & Handmer 1995; Gray & Brewers 1996; Morrill 1996; Santillo et al. 1998) . Much of the controversy surrounds the subjective nature of risk. The 4P approach would use economic instruments, in the form of an environmental assurance bond, to control the behavior of an HCP applicant and to objectify risk. The size of the bond would equal the costs of potential worst-case damages. A portion of the bond would be returned, with interest, after the HCP applicant demonstrates that worst-case damages are less than had been expected originally. Ultimately, the entire bond could be returned with interest when it is demonstrated that an HCP will not result in any unacceptable damages. Such a demonstration would depend on a satisfactory reduction in uncertainty, which might be obtained only through adaptive management.
The 4P approach reverses a common scenario in HCPs. Some HCPs require additional mitigation from the permittee if new information demonstrates a need for it (e.g., Washington Department of Natural Resources 1997 ). Clearly, this creates a disincentive against research and monitoring by the permittee because such an investment may result in additional costs for future mitigation. In contrast, the 4P approach affixes a positive economic value to information. A reduction of uncertainty enhances economic opportunity for the permittee.
The 4P approach forces HCP permittees to act cautiously. If they make a mistake due to a poor understanding of the ecosystem, then they lose their bond. With better understanding, the services return a portion of the bond and may assent to further use of a natural resource. Better understanding can also lead to innovative management practices that protect species and their habitats but still allow economically practicable resource use. In this respect, the 4P approach is different from other bonds recommended for HCPs. Hood (1998) recommends a performance bond to cover the cost of additional mitigation that may be necessary over the term of an HCP. As described, this bond offers no incentive for adaptive management because it is not returned to the permittee as a reward for better information or innovative management practices. As with Hood's (1998) bond, the 4P approach might resolve misgivings members of the public feel toward HCPs. The public should be more willing to accept the risks of an HCP when a bond is posted to pay for damages.
The main problem with the 4P approach is that it requires an amendment to the ESA. Neither Section 10(a) nor its legislative history say anything about bonds. But in an era when other environmental problems, such as air and water pollution, are addressed through economic solutions such as pollution taxes and tradable pollution-discharge permits, the 4P approach is within the realm of possibility. Another problem arises from the cost of precaution. As discussed earlier, deferring resource use imposes an economic cost on the permittee, who could pass this cost on to society by reducing habitat conservation in the future. In conjunction with the maximum-extent-practicable criterion of Section 10(a), the 4P approach trades precaution in the short-term for habitat over the long-term. Because the bond generates monetary interest, however, habitat lost due to the cost of precaution could be minimal (Costanza & Cornwell 1992) .
The human activities, time span, and land area covered by HCPs vary widely, so the proposed economic incentives may not be applicable to all HCPs. The information obtained from HCPs covering a small area (e.g., Ͻ 100 ha) or a short time span (e.g., Ͻ 10 years) may have little value. On the other hand, information obtained from large HCPs in which ecosystem-scale behavior can be studied should have considerable value. The 4P approach may not be feasible for HCPs developed by small businesses, because the cost of an assurance bond equal to worst-case damages would be too much to bear (Costanza & Cornwell 1992) . Therefore, the 4P approach might be most appropriate for large commercial forests or large real-estate developments, which Costanza and Cornwell (1992) claim can be regulated by a 4P approach. Appropriate incentives will be different for different human activities. Mitigation credits may be inappropriate for HCPs causing irreversible habitat loss (e.g., real-estate development), but may be appropriate for forest management.
Conclusion
When the Secretary of the Interior issued the no-surprises policy, he made a mistake similar to that of the original ESA: there was no mechanism for compromise.
If applicants met specified conditions, then they were granted "general assurances" that amounted to absolute regulatory certainty. Fortunately, recent regulations codifying the no-surprises policy increase the potential for adaptive management in HCPs. Unfortunately, the prospects for genuine adaptive management remain unpromising. The quality of adaptive management in HCPs will be determined through negotiations, and without economic incentives applicants are unlikely to adopt costly experimental approaches for managing natural resources.
Economic incentives for adaptive management are not ideal because they too involve compromise. Direct payments to private landowners may divert funds away from public conservation agencies, and tax incentives may reduce government budgets for environmental programs. Awarding mitigation credits entails weighing the value of conventional mitigation (i.e., habitat protection or restoration) versus the value of reliable information. Delays imposed by the 4P approach may lead to conflicts between the cost of precaution versus the benefits of more tangible conservation measures.
Most conservation dilemmas are enmeshed in considerable scientific uncertainty. Although we will never eliminate uncertainty, we must strive to reduce it. As conservation biologists, we need information that increases our understanding of managed ecosystems. We should also appreciate the substantial costs of acquiring such information, especially when dealing with natural processes that operate over large areas and long time spans. Most conservation dilemmas are resolved through political compromise, and adaptive management may be no different. When financial resources are limited, we may have to reconcile the competing goals of habitat protection and reliable information. If we value knowledge about managed ecosystems, then we should determine its fair price and find ways to pay for it.
